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A Critique of Yorùbá Judgment: Non-Western Performance 
Aesthetics and the Development of the Nigerian Stage
Glenn Odom
Art historians have done extensive work explaining Yorùbá systems of 
aesthetics, particularly with regard to the philosophy and practice of representation. 
Scholarship on Yorùbá aesthetics has produced a series of questions surrounding 
the relationship of audience to representation, the relationship of representation to 
authority, and the fluidity, innate power, and interpretation of representation. This 
work, particularly the discussion of àse or the authority of art, has not become a 
regular part of discussions of African theatrical theory and practice: in point of fact, 
despite the work of Wole Soyinka, Margaret Drewal, Andrew Apter, Karin Barber, 
and others, a vast array of contemporary criticism on African theatre still uses Bertolt 
Brecht and Antonin Artaud for theoretical grounding. Given that African writers are 
aware of Brecht and Artaud, and that the formal changes in theatre have a surface 
similarity to Brechtian alienation and Artaud’s theatre of cruelty, an understanding 
of contemporary Yorùbá aesthetics can be found in the disjunctions and intersections 
between traditional Yorùbá aesthetics and avant-garde Western theory. With recourse 
to Artaud’s discussion of Western modes of representation as a point of contrast, 
this article explains the explicitly political ramifications of alterations of traditional 
Yorùbá aesthetics. In the Yorùbá system, where representation is always an act of 
authority but also conceived as fluid, the avenues of resistance are less clear than 
in the Western system, where the authority of representation, generally conceived 
as stable, is present as an aftereffect in the audience.
If one accepts the arguments of modernist Western theatrical practitioners such 
as Brecht, Artaud, Augusto Boal, and Jerzy Grotowski, the crisis point in Western 
aesthetics and its relationship to politics came early in the development of Western 
theatre. When Parmenides postulates that all being is unified, he effectively erases 
the possibility of representation. If that-which-is is and that-which-is is unified and 
unchanging, then there can be no divisions in the univocality that would allow 
man to intervene and create representations. Aristotle opens the possibility of an 
analogical world in which every being is related to that-which-is, but not part of 
the same being. The scholastics, humanists, and neoplatonists take this as a point 
of entry into their understanding of both metaphysics and representation, and thus, 
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as Derrida says, the “theater is born in its own disappearance, and the offspring 
of this movement has a name: man.”1 In other words, this aspect of Western 
metaphysics is founded upon the idea of a rupture between being and form that 
theatrical representation is always trying to bridge. When the essence of being is 
separated from forms, the assumption of an ordered universe requires that some 
force—man—step in and recognize these forms for what they are, connect them 
one to another, and place them back in the order to which they belong. As long 
as Western systems of representation postulate a difference between signifier and 
signified—as long as the concept of representation is intimately connected with 
metaphor, analogy, and allegory—Artaud laments that theatre will never reach 
its potential for “total revolution.”2 Man, in his interpretive capacity, will always 
mediate between representation and “truth.” The political impetus of modern avant-
garde theatre manifests in a desire to change this relationship and either remove the 
separation between representation and truth or reveal the illusion of representation 
so as to reposition man.
The fundamental conditions of Yorùbá representation are different but not 
diametrically opposed. There is no initial postulation of a rupture between signifier 
and signified, and the process of “reading” representation relies upon the authority 
of the representation and the authority invoked by the reader. The assimilative 
Yorùbá aesthetics places itself squarely inside the ìwà (inherent unchanging quality) 
of the world and authorizes the absolute nature of its representations through the 
evocation of àse (authority).3 The crisis point—or the point of revolution—for 
Yorùbá theatre and the Yorùbá political world comes when the assimilative nature 
of Yorùbá aesthetics is no longer able to match the old sources of àse to the present 
manifestations of what should be a stable ìwà. In other words, the question for 
contemporary Yorùbá theatre is about the authority of representation over time, 
not its imputed reality.
Traditional Yorùbá Aesthetics: The Voice of Art 
I begin this section with a standard disclaimer. The Yorùbá were not historically 
a homogenous or isolated group, nor have they become so despite the regionalism 
of contemporary Nigerian politics. The Christian and Islamic traditions, along 
with Igbo, Hausa, and others, have been assimilated into Yorùbá culture. What 
follows is not the assertion of, nor the quest for, a lost, pure Yorùbá aesthetic. My 
definition of Yorùbá performance blends the examples of praise songs explored 
by Barber, religious rituals and festivals explored by Drewal, contemporary drama 
discussed by Soyinka, and, as will be apparent, the performative dimensions of 
the plastic arts. This definition encompasses hundreds of different manifestations 
of Yorùbá performance and, thus, while it is possible to discuss similarities across 
performance media, it is not possible to give a representative example that can 
account for each of the aspects of performance at stake in this argument. Likewise, 
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my brief statements on the Western metaphysics of representation are intended 
to show points along a developmental line and do not take into account specific 
variation within and outside of this line. 
The above disclaimer itself opens one of the first characteristics of Yorùbá 
aesthetics: they are essentially assimilative even as they reflect a stable relationship 
with the universe. Wole Soyinka has commented on this phenomenon, saying 
that, unlike Yorùbá theatre, “Western dramatic criticism habitually reflects 
the abandonment of a belief in culture as defined within man’s knowledge of 
fundamental unchanging relationships between himself and society and within the 
larger context of the observable universe.”4 Essentially, Soyinka argues that the 
best theatre, while it may adopt and adapt a variety of forms that evoke the logics 
of different philosophies, ultimately concerns itself with issues that transcend the 
boundaries of these philosophies. Soyinka’s concept of “a fundamental unchanging 
relationship” is mirrored in the Yorùbá notion of ìwà, which designates the active 
manifestation of innate qualities of people or things. Ìwà is simultaneously the stable 
category of character into which one fits and an expression of the unique character 
one has in relationship to the cosmos. Both the commonality and the uniqueness, 
however, must be able to assimilate new cultural elements and individual difference. 
One’s ìwà does not change, but the mode of expressing it might. 
One aesthetic manifestation that displays the relationship between assimilation 
and ìwà is the performance of oríkì (generally translated as praise songs). Karin 
Barber says:
 
[This performance] appears to lack closure and boundaries, 
going on and on in an undifferentiated stream until some 
external reason, rather than an inner formal requirement, brings 
the performance to a halt. . . . An oríkì performance appears 
endlessly accommodating and incorporative . . . [containing] 
not only elements drawn for the ‘pool’ of oríkì, but chunks of 
Ifa divination verses, proverbs, arö (cumulative narrative poems) 
and even riddles. . . . [T]here is no determinate, ‘authentic’ text, 
but rather continual and fluid variations on a set of possibilities.5 
Oríkì performance must adapt to the changing conditions around it. The song must 
be appropriate in order to praise its subject through a variety of circumstances. 
While the ìwà of the figure receiving the praise is stable, the song must be endlessly 
assimilative to continue to praise its subject regardless of situation. If one considers 
this in light of Aristotelian tragedy, the difference is plain. Aristotle postulates a 
stable mechanism—the evocation of fear and pity—and a set of formal unities by 
which this mechanism is constructed. Aristotelian tragedy need not be concerned 
with authorizing its own voice, because this authority is manifested in the static 
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forms. The authority for Aristotle is always transmitted from the gods through the 
playwright, in a precise form, to the audience. 
Yorùbá aesthetics does not deny the possibility of conferring authority via 
formal elements, but this is one of many mechanisms rather than the primary 
method. While in the example of oríkì performance form shifts to allow for the 
stability of function, David Doris discusses how static forms in sculpture and 
photography can simultaneously evoke the individual ìwà and a communally 
understood àse. Traditional Yorùbá sculpture has a limited number of poses, each 
with a specific meaning, and photographic subjects often adopt these poses so as 
to associate themselves with the àse of the pose: “the individuality of the portrait’s 
sitter is acknowledged, but it is also transfigured, as it were, by his self-identification 
with a category of persons.”6 In this case, the photographer transposes the form, 
along with its symbolic content, into a new context. Yorùbá aesthetics does not 
codify the Western distinction between content and form in a consistent manner. 
Thus, when contemporary Yorùbá theatre, such as Soyinka’s A Dance of the Forest, 
calls attention to the fluidity of symbolic representation, this articulates rather than 
violates Yorùbá aesthetic principles.
As one might expect in a society with a strong concept of ìwà as innate qualities 
related to one’s societal position, Yorùbá art is often didactic in its relationship to 
specific power structures. This didacticism, however, must always justify its àse 
or authority, which leads to the mixture of a display of unarguable wisdom and 
the self-conscious need to authorize this wisdom. Andrew Apter argues that the 
expression of àse is “at once the most profound and most difficult stage of entry 
into Yoruba culture.”7 Access to power is restricted, and this restriction is, in part, 
due to the inability of ordinary human beings to conceptualize the profundity of 
the ancient sources of power. Thus, according to Apter’s arguments, descriptions 
and evocations of àse are likewise restricted and profound. What follows in Apter’s 
argument is a detailed analysis of a ritual song that invokes the àse of Shango in 
praise of a king. Apter notes that the song moves from ambiguity and potential 
confusion into a clear declaration of the will of Shango. The performance is not 
complete without both of these portions. Shango’s authority is unquestioned but 
must be evoked and established through somewhat obscure means. The king gains 
authority through this association with Shango, but this authority is confirmed only 
by the king’s already existing relationship to Shango, which is manifested in his 
ability to correctly interpret and evoke Shango’s àse. The authority, the àse, cannot 
be approached directly, but, once present, it cannot be denied. 
Roland Abiodum shifts the focus to objects after they have been imbued with 
àse. Sculptures and other decorations on shrines, for instance, “contribute to and 
share in the power of the sacred space.” These objects, too, have been imbued by an 
outside force through the manipulations of “secret names.” While the objects have 
innate qualities and have been imbued permanently with àse, there is a continual 
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re-invocation of these qualities that reinforces the power of the objects and, as 
significantly, reminds the audience of this power. An object or person may have a 
permanent, unchanging ìwà and have established its àse and still require the same 
rituals that were initially necessary to establish these principles. Abiodum goes 
on to discuss “specific colors, patterns, motifs, and aspects of the subject matter”8 
emphasized in the plastic arts that are associated with àse. Certain forms, like 
the position of the sitter in the photographs described above, are associated with 
power—although even their power must perpetually be reestablished and reinforced. 
What might be seen as metatheatricality in Western theatre, then, is an intrinsic 
part of Yorùbá aesthetics. A performance must question its own status and authority 
in order to evoke this authority. Femi Osofisan’s Morontodun demonstrates this 
sort of questioning directly when one of his characters remarks, “We came here 
to do a play, a simple play. But History—or what some of you call Chance or 
Fortune—has taken over the stage. And it will play itself out, whether we like it 
or not.”9 The authority of the piece arises from a loosely defined exterior source. 
Something has taken over the performance. The fact that the identity of this force 
is not resolved within the play, however, differentiates Osofisan’s work from the 
traditional Yorùbá aesthetic, which might begin in obscurity but moves toward 
clarity. I return to this differentiation and its potential for political resistance in the 
final section of this article.
After authority is established, it still must find an audience in order to be 
didactic. The relationship of audience to performance, like the invocation of àse, is 
not something that the Yorùbá aesthetic takes for granted. The question of audience 
is explicitly a question of interpretation. This interpretation may involve intellectual 
musing or direct action of the artistic object on the spectator. Abiodum says that 
“[w]ithout Ohun (‘voice,’ the ‘verbalization or performance of the word’) neither 
Epe (‘curse,’ the malevolent use of ase’) nor Ase (‘life-force’) can act to fulfill its 
mission.” This is true of both the plastic arts and the performed arts. “Iluti (literally 
‘good hearing’) idiomatically refers to qualities such as obedience, teachableness, 
understanding and, above all, the ability to communicate. It determines whether 
or not a work of art ‘is alive’ and ‘responds’.”10 These qualities are ascribed to the 
piece of art, not to the spectator. The artwork itself must have a sensibility of the 
ìwà of the world, and the ability to communicate this ìwà. Art must hear and respond 
to the word, just as the spectator must hear and respond to the art. Once this cycle 
is closed, the spectator will emerge with a new and strengthened understanding of 
his place in the world.
While Abiodum moves quickly across a variety of performance and plastic 
arts, the issue of interpretation is perhaps easiest to understand when looking at a 
particular instance. “Àrokò” designates a broad category of what could loosely be 
termed sculpture. An àrokò uses commonplace items to a send a specific message 
in a language accessible only to members of a specific group. Phillip Adédotun 
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Ògúndèjí discusses the difficulty in understanding an àrokò. The container of the 
àrokò can carry part of the meaning itself, as does the specific arrangement of items 
within the container. Sometimes the meaning of the container conflicts with the 
meaning of the object sent. These messages are fluid, as demonstrated by a legend 
Ògúndèjí recounts in which a warlord seeks an àrokò from his dead mother about 
an upcoming battle. As the message is being returned, a piece of fruit falls into the 
container, and the warrior thus misunderstands his mother’s warning. The legend 
is but one of many that emphasize the variability of this message, but, ultimately, 
the moral of the tale is that the warrior should have been more discerning in his 
interpretation. The logical link here is that art contains àse through its connection 
to an ìwà, and the warrior should have been able to determine that what he was 
receiving was not in accordance with either of these. In several versions of the tale, 
he dies horribly in battle.
Misinterpretation carries consequences, and, in this case, the warrior is part of 
the message’s intended audience and thus should have had access to the symbolic 
know-how to decipher it. Other artistic pieces, however, rely on a different kind of 
interpretation. Ààlè, sculptures of a type that may enact a curse or a blessing upon 
their audience, are not bearers of a message, but are themselves the message. An 
empty snail shell nailed to a post is both a warning of what will happen to a thief 
and a curse to make certain that any thieves get what they deserve. This mode of 
sculpture is problematic inasmuch as the àse is there whether or not the “audience” 
makes an active attempt to interpret the sign. The interpretation, in this case, is the 
curse or blessing bestowed upon the audience, which signals the power of àse to 
demonstrate its ohun regardless of the circumstances. The audience becomes the 
physical embodiment of the interpretation.
Given the complexity of modes of interpretation and the dangers of failure, 
it is not surprising that the Yorùbá people have a god under whose jurisdiction 
interpretation falls. Emmanuel Eze says that
[C]entral to the interpretation and understanding of Odu [the 
written version of Ifa, a prophetic corpus] is Esu. . . . In fact, the 
Odu is regarded as praise songs to Esu—Esu being considered the 
way as well as barrier to ashé [a phonetic transcription of àse]. 
Esu is the he who makes understanding possible (or impossible!). 
He is the mediation a). between text and reader b). between 
text and meaning c). between truth and understanding (or lack 
thereof). In fact, in Yorùbá language, Esu is called onitumo, “one 
who loosens knowledge[,]” i.e. the interpreter.11
Thus, the authority of the art depends upon interpretation which itself depends 
upon establishing communication with the authority of a god who himself requires 
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interpretation. Apter’s claim about the necessary complications of the Yorùbá 
language when it comes to àse become much clearer when put in this context. 
When complete, the interpretation of Yorùbá art is conceived as a concrete 
force. The correct understanding of the audience adds to the àse of the piece. Force 
and authority have been generated and reinforced. While someone can misinterpret 
art, the art cannot end with misinterpretation. The correct view—however complex 
and idiosyncratic this view may be—will emerge eventually, as seen in the 
innumerable fables of the fates that befall those who fail to understand the artistic 
projects with which they are presented. While Aristotelian theatre certainly creates 
an effect in the audience, the concept of the reciprocity of the exchange is missing. 
The audience doesn’t explicitly need to interpret events; these events, by nature of 
their form, will create fear and pity and thereby lead to virtue. The commonplace 
that the audiences at African theatrical events tend to participate more is not simply 
a physical reality or mode of appreciation of Yorùbá theater; it is a metaphysical 
part of the aesthetic grounding of the stage. Art requires participation.
In relating the Yorùbá aesthetic to the neoclassical understanding of classical 
representation, which has shaped mainstream contemporary British and American 
theatre, several points of contrast become clear. While Western representation is 
bound up in the question of the unity of being, the Yorùbá aesthetic takes this unity 
for granted. The authority of classical Western modes of art comes from innate and 
permanent qualities of form, which stem from a single concept of virtue. In Yorùbá 
art, authority is simultaneously innate and in need of constant invocation and will 
be obscure through parts of this process. Interpretation is something that happens 
to Western art. Interpretation is Yorùbá art. The spectator in Yorùbá art may, at 
times, be passive, but the ohun of the art will enact an active interpretation upon 
the spectator. Western art in various periods has attempted to codify the relationship 
between form and function and between content and form. The fluidity of these 
relationships is fundamental to Yorùbá art. Yorùbá art, then, conceives of itself as 
interactive and fluid, but also as possessing a physical and spiritual concreteness 
that has a direct impact on the world.
Theatrical and Political Ramifications: 
Contemporary Yorùbá Theatre and the Western Avant-Garde
While the above points may be interesting in the abstract, their importance 
is magnified by the fact that art, particularly performance art and theatre, has 
become a major mode of political action in Nigeria. The unique qualities of Yorùbá 
aesthetics require that the analysis of this political impetus be separated from both 
Western theatrical theory and Jameson’s statement that “everything is ‘in the last 
analysis’ political.”12 
To be perfectly clear, I agree with Brecht, Boal, Artaud, Soyinka, and Osofisan 
when they claim, in their various ways, that every mode of theatre has or had a 
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direct connection to a particular set of conditions—an ideology or set of discursive 
practices. Brecht claims that 
[t]he proper way to explore humanity’s new mutual relationships 
is via the exploration of the new subject-matter. . . . [S]imply 
to comprehend the new areas of subject-matter imposes a new 
dramatic and theatrical form. . . . [P]etroleum resists the five 
act form.13
Osofisan says that 
The dramatic heritage available to us has simply proved 
inadequate. And it is not only that the machinery provided by 
the old society for dealing with chaos has lost its capacity for 
total effect, it is also that the very metaphysical raison d’être 
of that machinery has been eroded with the advent of a new 
sociopolitical philosophy.14 
Presumably Osofisan’s “dramatic heritage” includes traditional Yorùbá theatre 
and the “five act form.” While the point is sometimes lost in the fiery polemics 
of these writers, the new theatre that they develop is itself contextual.15 The most 
radical avant-garde will someday become the “dramatic heritage” that has “proved 
inadequate.” Likewise, since both the theatrical and socio-political conditions 
differ widely from Europe to Africa, it would be foolish to assume that the political 
implications of either the traditions or changes of traditions that occur in one venue 
would apply to the other. In what I describe below, there are some contingent, 
local ways that traditional Yorùbá aesthetics seem, like Artaud’s mythical Orient, 
to point toward what Western theatre could or should become. Whether or not the 
West chooses to draw artistic inspiration from Africa, traditional African aesthetics 
bears the same relationship to contemporary African life that traditional Western 
aesthetics bears to contemporary Western life—in both cases, theatrical experience 
and lived experience have become separated, and theatre has been deprived of a 
vital political power. Nevertheless, the nature of the Western separation, due to its 
familiarity, helps to clarify the homologous African situation. 
Jacques Derrida, in one of the most complete analyses of Artaud’s relationship 
to Western systems of representation, declares that the “implacable necessity” of 
the theatre of cruelty operates as a “permanent force” causing us to be aware of 
the “declining, decadent, and negative” aspect of Western theatre and return to its 
(pre)classical roots. Specifically, Derrida argues that the “theater of cruelty is not a 
representation,” that it produces “the closure of classical representation, but also the 
reconstitution of a closed space of original representation, the archi-manifestation 
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of force or life.” The space of original representation is closed inasmuch as there 
is no separation between signifier and signified or between object and ground: this 
“force or life” does not need to point outside itself to find its completion. In this 
type of theatre the mise en scène is fully integrated into the meaning of the piece 
and the importance of words diminish and shift. By the same token, however, 
Derrida recognizes the “fatal” necessity of representation to reemerge in theatre’s 
repetition: “Because it has always already begun, representation therefore has no 
end. But one can conceive of the closure of that which is without end. Closure is 
the circular limit within which the repetition of difference infinitely repeats itself.”  
This explains the necessity of the theatre of cruelty to be an active, mobile force. 
The closure of representation, once accomplished, is itself represented, and then 
the process repeats itself. Theatre of cruelty, if it remains motionless, becomes a 
representation of the closure of representation rather than an actual closure: hence 
Artaud’s comments that “As much as I love the theater, I am, for this very reason, 
equally its enemy.”16 Western theatre was born of representation and, according 
to Derrida, will either remain dead or engage in a perpetual struggle to “present” 
rather than “represent.” This struggle gives Western theatre its vitality, and the 
necessity of the struggle causes Artaud’s enmity.
The Yorùbá aesthetic is a radically unclosed system in this regard. 
Representations always reach outside themselves to establish àse and create the 
interpretative link with the audience. Conversely, traditional Yorùbá aesthetics 
cite the power of Ààlè to have concrete effects regardless of interpretation. 
Representation is at once totally dependent on the “metaphysics of language” 
that Artaud seeks to modify and the “unperverted pantomime” that Artaud seeks 
to create.17 Yorùbá aesthetics cannot remain motionless because of the necessity 
of interpretation and reinscription, but the motion of the aesthetic is to reinforce 
existing lines of power or create compatible new sources of authority. It is Osofisan’s 
contention, as cited above, that traditional Yorùbá theatre’s ability to communicate 
has been eroded by the advent of a “new sociopolitical philosophy.” The nature 
of theatre’s communication for Osofisan (to say nothing of Brecht, Artaud, Boal, 
Derrida, and Soyinka) is found in
 
its stance of direct confrontation with the mode and direction of 
all preceding literature . . . taking [its] stand on the aggressive 
principle that the world is always susceptible to human action 
and can thus be changed for the better, seek[ing] to harness and 
promote . . . literature as an organic phenomenon, ineluctably 
linked to the process of our historical evolution . . . the creation 
of a literature . . . which is . . . deliberately and subtly oriented 
towards a positive ideological indoctrination.18 
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Because the changing political situation in Nigeria deprived theatre of its ability to 
communicate, the implication of the above passage is that the old theatrical modes 
must be resisted because they are part of a negative “ideological indoctrination.” 
Traditional Yorùbá theatre and African manifestations of Western theatre are bound 
up in the regionalization that brought down the First Republic and lead to the 
civil war and the emergence of a string of military dictators. Osofisan rejects this 
theatrical tradition as vehemently as Artaud rejects that of the West.
The primary question in this case is not the specific political intervention 
that Osofisan or any Yorùbá playwright makes, but a reading of the theoretical 
ramifications of the aesthetic interventions. Nevertheless, some political context 
is useful. Soyinka’s A Dance of the Forest was performed on the eve of Nigerian 
independence in 1960. Osofisan’s Morountodun was performed in 1979 as Olusegun 
Obasanjo held open elections, after the hope of the newly formed nation had been 
severely challenged by a civil war and thirteen years of military rule. In both cases, 
the playwrights expressed skepticism about the potential of the newly emerging 
government. Because, however, the new government had not actually come into 
existence in either of these cases, the object of critique in the two shows is not so 
much a specific political policy as a general understanding of the political system. 
I argue, along with Brecht, Boal, and Artaud, that theatrical genre always interacts 
with politics at this level, but these two examples accentuate the point. 
I have elsewhere discussed the characteristics of the political situation 
surrounding Soyinka’s performance—a preponderance of autobiographical and 
biographical material that conflates the individual and the nation, an insistence 
on a teleology that traces itself from the ancient past to the glorious future, and 
the utter exclusion of a shifting set of groups from the concept of the individual 
and the teleology of the nation.19 The sheer quantity and homogeneity of political 
publications during the late 1950s make the identification of these characteristics 
relatively straightforward.20 Soyinka’s text functions as an intricately crafted 
reminder of the traditional Yorùbá aesthetic’s need for interpretation and repeated 
validation of àse. A Dance of the Forest is a play that resists the easy certainties 
of pre-independence discourse. It replaces demagoguery with fluid transactional 
identities that constantly fail to reaffirm their place in the world. Notably, its final 
lines involve the unfinished performance of a proverb about seeking knowledge: 
“When the crops have been gathered, there will be time enough for the winnowing of 
the grain.”21 While Soyinka’s text does not follow any of the traditional performance 
modes of the Yorùbá, the critique he makes fits within the philosophical implications 
of the aesthetic parameters of the form—knowledge, interpretation, and power can 
come about only through transaction and effort.
Osofisan is a more complex case in this regard. Soyinka is a part of the dramatic 
practice that Osofisan rejects, and Soyinka’s critique of the First Republic’s modes 
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of representation was already well established by 1979. Osofisan’s play follows the 
promise of democratic elections and the end of years of military dictatorship. The 
First Republic had collapsed, the oil boom was over, and the scars of the civil war 
were visible across the country. Traditional modes of aesthetics, at least in their 
post-colonial form, had failed to create for Osofisan a theatre capable of dealing 
with these realities. One of the strongest voices to emerge in the midst of these 
realties was that of Olusegun Obasanjo, then the military dictator and eventually 
the civilian president of Nigeria. The fact that Obasanjo remains an influential 
political figure makes his role in the creation of political discourse more difficult 
to codify. He has been praised by figures ranging from Nelson Mandela to Nadine 
Gordimer and condemned by Soyinka and a number of other Nigerians. 
Obasanjo’s remarkable staying power as a figure in the fluid waters of Nigerian 
politics is, in part, attributable to his ability to assimilate new realities into his 
existing rhetoric. For instance, in August of 1975, upon his first speech to the press 
as the Chief of Staff of the new military regime (of which he would become the 
head in 1976), Obasanjo said:
It is our intention to adopt a military posture in all our actions. 
This Administration wishes to be close to the people. It will, 
therefore, be responsive to the yearnings and aspirations of 
Nigerians. It will be an open Administration, quite ready to 
consider genuine and constructive criticism as well as ideas 
from any quarters. This does not mean that the Government 
will be taking dictation from any quarters. Every action of the 
Government will be as a result of extensive discussion and very 
careful consideration.22
The contrast between this speech and those of the pre-independence parties, the 
National or Northern People Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG) is clear. The earlier 
speeches tell Nigeria what it is, how it became so, and what it will be. These parties’ 
confidence is intimately tied to their identity: the pre-independence speeches erase 
the possibility of dissent and create a unilateral national identity that is as limiting 
as it is unifying. Obasanjo’s speech, in contrast, explicitly calls attention to the 
source of its authority—the military—and the limitations of that authority—the 
will of the people—and the need to interpret both carefully. On a continent rife 
with extraordinarily powerful military regimes and non-military monarchies and 
dictatorships, actively soliciting the opinion of the people is a striking rhetorical 
strategy, regardless of the actual manifestations of power within the regime.
As Obasanjo left office in 1979, he relinquished power to Shagari, whose 
opening speech parallels Obasanjo’s earlier speech, replacing the military with 
the constitution:
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Today, our new constitution comes into effect; a constitution 
carefully drawn up by ourselves for ourselves. We are assuming 
office as a result of a free, democratic and peaceful election. We 
must be proud of this, and we must be grateful to God and to 
all those who have worked so hard to make it possible. This is 
an occasion, which calls for sober reflection on the problems of 
the First Republic in order to appreciate the magnitude of the 
tasks ahead.23
The past authorizes Shagari’s new government only after it has been interpreted 
by careful reflection. This careful reflection both presumably precedes and follows 
the drawing up of a constitution that is presented as a mutual agreement between 
government and people. Aside from reflections on the past, Shagari authorizes 
himself through the agreement of the people and through God. Unlike the pre-
Independence politicians whose occasional fluidity only concretized their own 
identities and that of the nation with its glorious past, Shagari implies that he is 
open to the fluid reinterpretations of the past that will result in ongoing dialogue. He 
draws his authority from a variety of sources as need dictates—God, the constitution, 
and history being three primary ones—and he makes this invocation explicit. He 
speaks of “encouraging” a “primary objective” whose authorship is only implied. 
He is a master at leading consistently without appearing authoritarian. In other 
words he has managed to adopt the fluidity of the Yorùbá aesthetic along with the 
stability of the ìwà and the self-conscious need to reinforce àse. He does all this 
while maintaining a very visible discourse with the public. He had a number of 
highly publicized meetings with Soyinka, for instance, in which he was careful to 
state that communication had taken place. 
Thus, Obasanjo and Shagari had crafted a political system difficult to challenge 
from within artistic practice. How could a self-avowedly revolutionary writer such 
as Osofisan resist an essentially assimilative aesthetic that already recognizes its own 
contingency and questions its own authority? This is a paradox no less difficult to 
conceive of than the repeated cycle of closure in Artaud’s perpetually unattainable 
theatre of cruelty. Apter has argued that àse is essentially mystifying, and so Osofisan 
employs a metatheatrically self-conscious demystification of authority by having 
the actor play the role of “director” speak these lines until he is interrupted:
In the end, peace came, but from the negotiating table, after each 
side had burned itself out. Yes, that’s history for you. . . . But still, 
you must not imagine that what we presented here tonight was 
the truth. This is a theatre, don’t forget, a house of dream and 
phantom struggles. The real struggle, the real truth, is out there, 
among you, on the street, in your homes; in your daily living 
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and dying. . . . We are actors, and whatever we present here is 
mere artifice, assembled for your entertainment. Tomorrow the 
play may even be different. It depends.24
The art pushes the possibility of àse onto the spectator. The vast historical swath 
of Morountodun, which traces the roots of contemporary problems to struggles in 
the mythical past, burns itself out as a mode of authority. The theatrical structure 
and the authority of the director are contingent on outside forces less important 
than the everyday truth of “the street.” 
Were these the final lines of the play, this theatre would still place the spectator 
in a traditional Yorùbá relationship to the stage, however, and thus would be in 
keeping with the contingent rhetoric of the politicians. As in traditional Yorùbá 
theatre, the audience is asked to conceive of themselves as active recipients, 
interpreters, and co-creators of a message. However, Osofisan’s text does not end 
there. The actors interrupt the director and “clamp their hands over his mouth.” 
These actors close in song: “Be always like this day / Beside me. Wear hope like a 
jewel: It never fades / It never fades / It never—.” The play ends with these actors 
frozen and the hero from the past and the hero of the present in “harsh spotlights, 
looking at each other.” 25 In other words, the director’s final speech, his ending and 
summation that tells the audience that the authority is theirs, is cut off by a song. 
The song, with its message that hope never fades, is itself cut off, and all that is left 
is an uneasy look between past and present. Unlike the openness of the traditional 
Yorùbá system of aesthetics that does eventually reach a conclusion, or Soyinka’s 
implication of a journey yet to be taken, this play ends in stasis, not movement. The 
director’s call for action and the song’s call for hope are both trapped between past 
and present, frozen in the glare of the lights. The final authority, divided somehow 
between past and present figures, is not transactional and fluid. 
Soyinka’s A Dance of the Forest is a riddle without an answer, a perpetual 
journey. Osofisan’s Morountodun is an end to riddles and a call for a new source 
of artistic and political authority. This is not an alienation effect, but it could be 
considered the reverse. The Yorùbá system of aesthetics calls attention to issues 
of authority, representation, and interpretation. Audiences are accustomed to being 
asked to participate in the invocatory process by which a performance is invested 
with its authority. Osofisan raises the possibility of such participation and then 
closes it down. His final moment of representation on the stage is symbolic in the 
sense that Artaud repudiates. The past and the present are represented by actors 
unself-consciously representing characters. One might read this bleak move toward 
a foundational Western aesthetic of representation as a plaintive reminder that the 
power granted by an invocatory participation in the process of authorization—a 
democratic vote for a government or a prayer for an orisha—is itself only a 
representation of actual participation and does not guarantee illuti or ohun. 
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Conclusions
Boal’s model of theatrical resistance requires the audience to break through 
what he sees as the passive nature instilled by Aristotelian theatre and participate 
actively in the performance. Brecht’s mode of resistance lies in forcing his audience 
to consider a variety of issues by exposing them to the illusion of the play. Artaud’s 
mode relies on a “visceral” reaction in the audience. Osofisan, in some regards, 
seems to offer a structurally opposed method. Boal inspires action by having the 
audience act; Brecht inspires thought by forcing the audience to think; Artaud 
inspires “life” by forcing the audience to feel. Were Osofisan’s work to function the 
same way, he would be inspiring the audience to apathy through a demonstration 
of the hopeless fixity of the system. This point would be amplified even further by 
the fact that traditional Yorùbá aesthetics are not fixed. 
Since this answer is obviously unacceptable, we are left with the idea that 
Osofisan does, in fact, uncover the illusions of traditional Yorùbá aesthetics. These 
are not the illusion of fixity provided by a neoplatonic ideal, but rather the illusion 
of choice and participation. These illusions rely on the idea that, while there is 
authority, this authority is perpetually reestablished from outside sources and a 
communal effort. Osofisan’s work addresses the crisis of a military authority that 
authorizes itself in a direct, violent way while maintaining the rhetorical illusion of 
a participatory system. In other words, while Bertolt Brecht destroys the illusion of 
the fixity of stage representation by calling attention to theatrical devices in order 
to give the audience a space in which to participate in questioning, Femi Osofisan 
destroys the illusion of participation in stage representation by calling attention to 
theatrical devices in order to remind the audience of their potential non-participation. 
Morountodun demonstrates the complexity of cross-cultural understandings 
of theatre. Eugenio Barba says that 
Today the very word “comparison” seems inadequate to me, 
since it separates the two faces of the same reality. I can say that 
I “compare” . . . traditions only if I compare their epidermises, 
their diverse conventions, the many different performance styles. 
But if I consider that which lies beneath those luminous and 
seductive epidermises and discern the organs which keep them 
alive, the poles of the comparison blend into a single profile.
While Barba is referring to Eurasian theatre here, his general point has certainly 
influenced critical approaches to understanding the relationship between African 
and Western theatre. According to Barba, “they are analogous principles because 
they are born of similar physical conditions in different contexts. They are not 
however homologous, since they do not share a common history.”26 Barba at once 
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acknowledges the possibility of shared conditions but notes that, even in cases 
of commonality, different contexts generate meaningful distinctions between 
“analogous principles.”
While academics have been espousing similar theoretical positions for decades, 
the results of this stance have been slow to manifest in theatrical theory. I have 
argued that radically different theoretical modes create theatre whose formal aspects 
must be understood in radically different ways, but this argument has a corollary that 
is no less significant for its existence on the very edge of textual and performance 
analysis. Theatre, in all the forms that I can conceive it, is a “representation” of 
man’s lived experience. In representing this experience to an audience that is, at 
least momentarily, joined in an interpretive community, theatre cannot help but 
shape the way the community perceives this experience. In this genre, then, the 
assumptions of a particular interpretive community are remarkably difficult to 
expunge. To conceive of radically different theatres is to conceive of a radically 
different life. This life cannot be reduced to any of our modern or postmodern 
variations of the idea of the other, because these ideas are already incorporated 
into how we perceive ourselves. Beyond hybridity, borrowing, and contact zones, 
there is something at stake in the pursuit of different theatricalities. Charlemagne 
famously said, “To have another language is to possess a second soul.” To have 
access to a second conception of representation is an equally potent doubling and 
displacement of our fundamental concept of reality. 
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